On the authority of Youssef Al-Fishi ... or the "black face" of the Houthis

English - Thursday 25 February 2021 الساعة 05:54 pm
NewsYemen, written by : Muhammad Ayesh

We should pause at this journalistic story at length whenever the Houthis talk about "reconciliation" and "reconciliation", especially when they export, under this title, a character like Yusef al-Fishi.

Fishi does not appear except when the group is at the height of the need to mobilize people, by making promises to them that none of them can, and not be included, fulfill.

The appearance of the last man as the head of the so-called "reconciliation committee" formed from the authority of Saada is very similar to his appearance in the period before his group's coup against the alliance with the Popular Congress and President Saleh, and then his disappearance since then.

Al-Fishi plays one of the most dangerous roles for the group, in sharp turns, a role that, if highlighted, reveals a lot about the way in which the Houthis conduct their struggles, battles, and even alliances.

Al-Fishi was, along with President Saleh, the main architect of the political agreement that led to the formation of a government and a supreme governing council between his group and the Popular Congress.

He led all the group's efforts to communicate and negotiate with Saleh and the conference to accomplish the agreement / alliance, and before the alliance finally fell, Al-Fishi had accomplished a very bad experience, both personally and publicly.

After the formation of the Supreme Political Council of the two parties, of which Al-Fishi was a member, it was the turn of forming the government, the conference would reject any declaration of formation before resolving disputes over quotas that should be applied to all institutions, not just ministries.

The most prominent controversy centered on the Republican Guard, the General Staff, national security and political leadership. The agreement was that the guards and the national security would be in the share of the conference, while the special forces and political security would be in the share of the Houthis, but the last two, who were controlling the four institutions, refused to hand over the guards and the nationalists and promised to hand them over after the formation of the government.

The leaders of the conference strongly rejected this, and after the efforts of Al-Vichy, the conference agreed and Saleh agreed to a written commitment signed by the Houthi leadership to the obligation to hand over the two institutions immediately after the announcement of the government. Like these, and instead of that he gave them his "face" and the "covenant of God" to implement this quota system after the government announcement. And when the conference is restless, he told them in front of Saleh: My face is kept for you from the paper.

Reluctantly, the conference agreed, and announced the formation of the government, and the Houthis did not fulfill their promise, but rather gave the Republican Guard to Abdul-Khaliq Al-Houthi, the brother of the group's leader, and moreover they set out to take numerous decisions and practices to unilaterally control most institutions.

After a while, differences worsened, and Al-Vichi's position in front of the conference became more critical, and so the two parties decided, in March 2017, that a delegation from them would go to Saada to meet Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi to settle the matter (and the idea was basically the idea of Al-Vichy, who might have wanted the leaders of the conference to help him in Pressing Al-Houthi face to face).

The delegation went, consisting of Aref Al-Zouka, Abdullah Abu Houria, Thiab Bin Maeili, Julaidan Hammoud Julaidan from the Popular Congress, and Youssef Al-Fishi, Saleh Al-Sammad and Mahdi Al-Mashat on behalf of the Houthis.

During the meeting, the leaders of the conference reviewed a 100-page file containing hundreds of decisions issued by the Houthis individually, chief among them the appointment of Abdul Hakim Al-Khaiwani as Deputy Minister of Interior, while the agreement was not to make the appointment of a deputy in the first place, and the appointments of the Judicial Council and the military regions, but the most severe differences Focusing on the oil company branch in Hodeidah and the group’s seizure of its revenues, while Saleh and the conference insisted on supplying the branch’s revenues to the central bank, the group insisted on directing the revenues to its leadership under the pretext of financing the fronts and the war effort (which they are doing until the moment).

When it came to talking about the Republican Guard and the National Security, Al-Fishi said to Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi: Sir, I turned my face to the conference and the leader, and now my face is black in front of them, and my face is from yours.


 Al-Houthi’s response was shocking to those who attended (I also heard the story from more than one of the participants in the meeting, and I am still unable until this moment to understand whether the man is only trying to disavow or tell the truth). He said: You have a right, but the problem is with my brother Abdul Khaleq (Badr al-Din al-Houthi) who refuses to hand over the Republican Guard, give me a chance until I understand him.

And he went on to explain to them the extent of his brother's recklessness and his obstruction of this agreement, and the matter came to say that if the Republican Guard withdrew from his brother, he feared that the latter would withdraw his forces from the impulse of Nehm in protest, which might lead to the fall of Sana'a !!

The attendees did not find anything to comment on, but they agreed with him to his promises, which were later never implemented.

The delegation returned with them and Al-Vichy returned, and this time was more lenient, and played a good role in convincing the conference that the problem solved salvation as long as "the master has promised to solve it."

After a few days, an important development occurred, approaching the end of the presidential term specified in the document establishing the political council. Al-Samad was the president, and he told the conference and his group that he did not want to extend it, due to his fatigue from the escalating differences between the two allies.

President Saleh had an idea, he said to Al-Vichy, therefore, you took over the presidency of the council, succeeding Al-Samad, and Al-Fishi responded that he would like that, but he would not be able to ask his group for this matter himself, and he preferred that the story appear as a proposal from the conference, and indeed the conference informed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi that he proposes to take over Al-Fishi Presiding over the council, and that was the straw that broke the back of the Fishi camel, as not a week passed since the proposal until the group withdrew Fishi from the membership of the Political Council and appointed Mahdi Al-Mashat as a substitute for it !!

The group was not afraid of the state of great rapprochement that had formed between Al-Vichy and Saleh, and in my interpretation that it was originally preparing for a clash with Saleh and the conference, and when I withdrew Vichy, it did so in order to lighten the long commitments that he had made to the conference.

Thus, the man left for Saada, to be forgotten there throughout the last period, and with the group heading towards the decisive side in a complex battle such as the battle of Ma'rib, it took him out of the political limbo and threw him to the forefront, and in the position of "Chairman of the Reconciliation Committee."

This committee aims to create as many divisions within the tribal community in Marib as possible, by making imaginary promises through a face whose word has no value, or to facilitate later disavowal of all his promises. Unfortunately, it is Vichy.

Such a role specifically, Saleh Habra refused, and decided to leave the group and retire in his home, and Saleh al-Sammad was also, according to the accounts of many of those who approached him (and I personally heard him fidgeting) felt this role bad and tried to evade it, but it was in front of Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi weaker From Saleh Habra.

And Fishi is weaker than all, and despite being a politicized person and enjoying the necessary awareness to win people and currents, he is the most personal of his group who volunteers for himself in front of the group's options, even if he is not convinced of those options.

Although everyone hopes that the day will come when the group realizes the importance of conceding to the Yemenis and reconciling them, but lying and breaking promises is a main feature of it, and no one can provide proof to the contrary, and the great verse on this feature is Fishy himself.