Abyan and Shabwa: Military and Security Theater in the Fight Against Al-Qaeda
English - Tuesday 15 June 2021 الساعة 08:50 am
NewsYemen, South24:
Since the establishment of the security belts and the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces in southern Yemen, the extremist organizations' attacks on these forces, their headquarters and their personnel have not stopped. In general, the national agenda of the southern forces represented a strong motivation to fight al-Qaeda. While the organization recently highlighted its ideological agenda to target these forces.
On the other hand, fighting the organization and "fighting terrorism" is not a priority for the Yemeni presidential forces, which are controlled by the Islah party (the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood). Perhaps it was natural for al-Qaeda to fight whoever is fighting it, as the organization has always worked with a pragmatic political methodology. But it is not normal for the Islah party to exchange the same methodology with Al-Qaeda. This made fighting the organization one of the tasks of the military and security formations of the Southern Transitional Council.
To the same extent, these formations have become a legitimate target for Al-Qaeda. According to the doctrinal legislation of the organization, these forces are subject to the provisions of apostasy and employment of infidels. This makes the fighting and killing of its members and those who are loyal to it permissible according to the concept of the group, which excludes the “legitimacy” forces from similar operations.
There are political dynamics behind the conflict crisis in southern Yemen, according to which the ideological dynamics of extremist groups and organizations unified.
In August 2019, the Yemeni crisis took another turn, when the Islah party forces in the Yemeni presidency headed to fight the Southern Transitional Council in Abyan and Aden, after they managed to drive the Shabwani elite out of Shabwa governorate. This security forces, trained and supported by the United Arab Emirates, represented the advanced military stage over al-Qaeda in Shabwa, and strengthened their loyalty to the national cause in southern Yemen, which the Islah party and some Yemeni forces considered a step leading the south to return to a pre-unity with the north. In May 1990.
The security and military theater of the Shabwani elite in Shabwa
It is important to note that the Shabwani Elite Forces led a military and security campaign supported by the International Coalition to Combat Terrorism in Yemen. The chaos of the Yemeni crisis justified the presence of a strong local ally fighting al-Qaeda in Shabwa. To this end, the Shabwani elite imposed its national agenda on a direct theater of operations to fight al-Qaeda.
In late April 2016, the Hadrami Elite Forces carried out the operation to liberate the city of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt, from the grip of Al-Qaeda. In this context, the need arose to secure some vital facilities in Shabwa governorate, such as the Balhaf gas facility, in addition to pursuing the elements of the organization that fled from Mukalla to safe havens in Shabwa, Abyan and Wadi Hadramawt.
In late 2017, the Shabwani Elite Forces were deployed to secure the Balhaf facility. Military plans do not require the consumption of forces in pursuit of mountains and distant valleys, before securing civilian cities. Meanwhile, the districts of southern Shabwa were still a stronghold of al-Qaeda, especially the areas of Azzan, Al-Houta, Al-Rawda and Haban, some of which the organization turned into Islamic emirates. Therefore, the attention of the Shabwani elite had to turn, after securing the Balhaf facility, to control and secure these areas in the southern border of the governorate, in what was known at the time as the Azzan axis operations. This came in conjunction with the Shabwani elite securing the southern and eastern parts of the city of Ataq, the capital of Shabwa, in addition to deploying security points along the international line "Ataq - Al-Abar".
By 2018, the Shabwani elite changed the strategy of tracking and prosecuting Al-Qaeda, and moved from securing civilian cities to remote centers and villages, to combing mountains, reefs, and valleys in the western and northern western locations that connect to the governorate of Al-Bayda, Abyan, and Marib.
On February 26, 2018, the Shabwani Elite Forces carried out Operation Decisive Sword to secure the district of Upper Egypt, west of Shabwa, where it began with a security deployment in Wadi Yashbom and extended to pursue al-Qaeda militants who fled to Wadi Sa`ra in the Musaina area, and ended with combing the hills adjacent to the Al-Mahfad district in Abyan governorate. On the other hand, on March 7, 2018, the security belt in Abyan governorate carried out Operation “The Blast Torrent”[3], the scene of which was the eastern districts adjacent to Shabwa. In conjunction with Operation Decisive Sword.
On September 22, 2018, the Shabwani Elite Forces raided an al-Qaeda camp in the "Amazifa" area in the Khora area in the Markha district, adjacent to the al-Bayda governorate, and killed the leader of the organization, Nayef al-Sayari al-Diyani (banned by Russia) and arrested three members of the organization.
On March 26, 2019, the Shabwa Elite Forces, with Arab and international support, carried out the "White Mountains" operation, aimed at securing the eastern districts of Shabwa, Marka and Nisab from al-Qaeda members.
The Shabwa Elite was able to extend its influence over large parts of Shabwa, where the control and security spread was an important factor in paralyzing the movement of al-Qaeda. This, in turn, placed the fight against smuggling and drug trafficking and the reduction of organized crime and even the phenomenon of revenge, in a security context related to the climate of fighting with Al-Qaeda, which quickly resolved these files and revealed their close connection with Al-Qaeda.
So that the role of the Shabwani elite in fighting al-Qaeda does not seem like a picnic, the Shabwani elite and all the military formations in the south have been subjected to an endless series of attacks and suicide and booby-trapped operations carried out by the organization during its period of political dormancy, since the beginning of 2015 until this moment.
The military and security theater after the Shabwa elite was expelled from Shabwa
In August 2019, the Shabwani Elite Forces attempted to impose their military control over the entire city of Ataq, where the northwestern part of Ataq was under the control of the government forces of the Islah party. The conflict between the two sides was subject to a temporary truce, during which the Islah party forces, backed by military reinforcements from the northern Ma’rib governorate, attacked the Shabwani Elite Forces and pushed them to withdraw, under Saudi pressure.
Regarding the course of the battle, the German Deutsche Channel indicated in a report, information about the participation of al-Qaeda elements in the fighting alongside the forces that came from Ma'rib. As a result, Shabwa returned to security chaos with the return of al-Qaeda to its former strongholds to practice its activity in a retaliatory manner against the Shabwa elite, in particular, and the security formations of the Southern Transitional in general.
Returning to the scene of the organization’s operations in Abyan governorate before the elite forces left Shabwa, the last operation carried out by al-Qaeda was on a security point for the security belt in the Ahwar district, east of Abyan, on August 28, 2018. On the following day, August 29, the organization attacked the al-Qurna checkpoint in the Al-Ain area in Loader did not result in casualties [7]. While the first operation carried out by the organization after returning to its former strongholds, targeted the same security belt forces in Ahwar on March 18, 2021. On the following day, March 19, 2021, the organization targeted a point of the security belt in the Al-Wadaya district.
The August 2018 operations are similar to the March 2021 operations, in terms of repeating the route that starts from Shabwa to Ahwar in the Abyan governorate, and then the next day’s attack that rises from the coastline to the mountainous areas towards the districts of Al-Wadea’ and Lawdar. This match - in the way of copying and pasting - refers to the same strategy for Al-Qaeda, the same path before and after, and the same goals.
Also, the organization’s missile attack on the Balhaf gas facility in early April was closer to the organization’s launch sites. In the same areas where the government camps of the Islamic Reform Party are located, al-Qaeda elements are holed up. Surprisingly, the security authorities that control Shabwa did not issue any comment about the attack on the Balhaf gas facility, even as a matter of responsibility.
Many analysts and experts go to great lengths in developing narratives to explain al-Qaeda's latency strategy. Some attribute this to the organization’s weakness and rupture, and some explain it as a pragmatic approach, or others believe that the organization has been infiltrated.
Perhaps all of these interpretations are correct, but the latency of Al-Qaeda in Yemen is inseparable from the interest of Yemeni groups and parties and their political goals in controlling the south. This is not just a matter of the day. The Arab Mujahideen returning from East Asia were used in the war to invade the south in 1994. This was also preceded by the liquidation of cadres and southern leaders between.
Some also attribute the apathy of al-Qaeda in early 2015 to the weak personality of its "leader" Qassem al-Rimi, which facilitated the Houthi group's attempt to impose its control over the south at the time. In light of these explanations, there have been many vague and undeclared attacks by the organization, although they bear its fingerprints, and given the opponents of the Southern Transitional Council, such as the “Reform Party” and parties within the Hadi government, an opportunity to benefit from these attacks, whose perpetrators move from within the lands they control, Far from the extent of coordination between these parties.
Finally, we should not neglect what is happening in Shabwa governorate, where assassinations of members of the Shabwa Elite Forces continue, taking place individually and regularly. All events say, even the extremist elements no longer operate within their limits and doctrinal controls, at least.
British researcher Elizabeth Kendall saw in one of her articles on al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen, what indicates their transformation into hired killers.
Commenting on the Al-Qaeda-related Zanzibar attack [8], which resulted in the killing and wounding of more than 30 soldiers and civilians from the Security Belt Forces (support and support), Kendall said that "Abyan Governorate is a traditional stronghold of Al-Qaeda, and the recent wave of attacks against the Security Belt forces there bears the hallmarks of operations Al-Qaeda".
This indicates, according to Kendall's interview with The National newspaper, that "elements of al-Qaeda have merged with the most widespread militias hostile to those forces loyal to the Southern Transitional Council." The unusually long time difference between each operation and the adoption of it by al-Qaeda means, according to the British researcher, "that al-Qaeda is being led rather than being led."
