What is Muscat doing in Yemen: Questions about the Omani role
English - Tuesday 15 June 2021 الساعة 10:08 am
NewsYemen, written by Majid Al-Madhaji :
A Royal Air Force of Oman aircraft landed in the capital, Sanaa, on June 5. On board was a delegation from the Omani Royal Office and a number of Houthi officials, including the group's chief negotiator and spokesman, Muhammad Abdul Salam. During their stay in Sana'a, the Omanis met prominent Houthi leaders, including the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, as part of diplomatic efforts seeking a ceasefire in Yemen.
This visit hints at the growing pressure on Muscat to play a greater role in pressuring the Houthis to accept a deal to end the fighting in the country—an approach Omanis have generally avoided for too long. The plane would not have landed in Sanaa without the permission of Saudi Arabia. A day before the delegation headed to Yemen, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi spoke with his American counterpart Anthony Blinken. Riyadh and Washington both seem to agree that the Omanis have the ability to advance the currently stalled negotiations.
The Sultanate of Oman is the country with the largest share of influence over the Houthis after Iran. Muscat has hosted Houthi officials since 2015, and has provided the group with a welcoming and secure environment to manage its international interests and engage politically with global and regional powers. While Muscat is not exactly a neutral platform, it does provide sufficient cover for international players in dealing with the Houthi delegation, something that would not be possible if the delegation were based in Tehran, Beirut or Damascus, where Iran and its allies have a great deal of influence. Thus, Oman has exceptional political leverage over the Houthis—an influence that other stakeholders interested in the Yemeni file, and who currently lack the means to pressure the Houthis, hope to capitalize on.
The Omani delegation's visit to Sana'a reflects recent efforts to break the current diplomatic stalemate, and raises an important new question about Oman's role in Yemen after six years of war. Many analyzes on this matter focus on Oman's national security interests in Mahra, amid the increasing Saudi military influence in the Yemeni province bordering Oman to the west. But the questions to be asked are: Is Muscat doing enough to create a chance for peace for its exhausted neighbour? More importantly, how are the privileges Oman grants to Houthi officials in its capital to be understood within the context of internal Gulf politics?
The general view of what Oman is doing is that it is simply playing its traditional role as a mediator in Gulf disputes, but this is not the whole story. In the past, Oman often required its guests not to engage in politics, and the sultanate's history of dealing with Yemeni exiles bears witness to this. For example, Oman asked Yemeni Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh, who fled to Muscat in the wake of the 1994 civil war, Leaving its lands after he regained his political activity after a long period of silence. It seems that the Sultanate has modified this rule in recent years in favor of the Houthis; Most of the latter's activity in Muscat is directed towards their conflict with the internationally recognized government in Yemen and with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Oman's relationship with its Saudi and Emirati neighbors is complex. While all of these countries are part of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman has carved out an approach independent of its neighbors, which at times has led to periods of competition and rising tensions. In 2011, Oman said it had uncovered an Emirati-run spy cell in the country. Muscat also refused to follow the example of Saudi Arabia in confronting Iran in recent years, and also refused to join the Arab coalition against the Houthis in Yemen or participate in the Saudi and Emirati blockade of Qatar. In the midst of the lingering disputes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over several issues, including the war in Yemen, political support and facilitation of diplomatic communication for the Houthis provided a golden opportunity for Oman to weaken Riyadh and Abu Dhabi at a small cost.
Yemen witnessed multiple shifts in politics and alliances during the war years, but there was one constant: Omani support for the Houthi group behind the scenes. Oman opened international doors for the Houthis, facilitated the travel of the group's officials, and sometimes worked to neutralize Houthi opponents. For example, after former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s alliance with the Houthis broke up and the first was killed by the group in December 2017, the Omanis contacted a large bloc of Saleh’s allies, specifically tribal leaders in northern Yemen and leaders in the General People’s Congress, and succeeded Oman neutralized them and ensured that they did not join the camp of the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition, in exchange for residency in the sultanate, while Qatar handled the payments.
Undoubtedly, in addition to Iran, Oman was the country that most embraced opponents of the Saudi-led coalition and opponents of the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Since 2017, Oman has hosted the Southern Movement faction led by Hassan Baoum, figures from Al-Mahra who oppose the coalition’s presence in the far eastern governorate of Yemen, and leaders of the Islah party from the line close to Doha, and provided them with a platform to express their opinions and expand their influence and investments.
This noticeable change in Omani policy came towards a tendency towards hostility at a time when Oman and Qatar became closer to each other during the cracking of diplomatic relations between Doha on the one hand and a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Qatar not only provided money to Yemeni personalities based in Muscat, but also provided financial support to the Omani state in 2020 when it was facing the economic fallout from the Corona pandemic. Qatar's Al-Jazeera channel also regularly promoted the views of Yemenis allied with Muscat, including its local allies in Mahra. Oman allowed figures opposed to the coalition to give public interviews from Muscat, which also reflects its departure from its usual base.
While Oman has proven to be more willing to weaken Saudi Arabia and the UAE, so far it seems unwilling to put any real pressure on the Houthis, and it seems that the pressure it is currently exerting is limited to trying to persuade the Houthis to receive the UN special envoy and diplomats from countries involved or interested in the war in Yemen. .
According to political, security and tribal sources, Oman's border with Yemen has been characterized by great flexibility for the movement of Houthi leaders and their allies. According to news reports, Iranian Ambassador Hassan Erlo arrived in Sana'a via Oman in October 2020. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, one of the main routes used to smuggle arms to the Houthi movement passes through Oman's territorial waters and its land border with Yemen. Undoubtedly, Muscat was the seat of the group's political growth. Given the vital services it provides to the Houthis, Oman has the ability to put more pressure on the group, and thus use its influence to urge the Houthis to make concessions, as the Houthis have a lot to lose if the Omanis are angry with them.
Muscat has always been seen as a respectful and impartial mediator in difficult situations. Indeed, Oman deserves its reputation as a courteous and sophisticated party in its diplomatic interactions and able to maintain cordial relations with all. But in the case of Yemen, Muscat charted a different, biased path.
Examining the Omani role in this way does not aim to condemn Muscat, but rather to explain its policies. A better understanding of Oman's interests in Yemen will help international actors improve their work with Muscat to address the latter's concerns regarding Yemen and form a more united front for diplomatic efforts to end the Yemeni war. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq's relations with his neighbors are better than that of his predecessor, the late Sultan Qaboos, but it is not clear how much this changed Oman's regional approach. The appointment of Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi in August 2020 as Minister of Foreign Affairs to succeed Yousef bin Alawi, who held this position for a long time and whose views sometimes created a kind of dissonance with other Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, also indicates the possibility of Oman moving towards adopting more cooperative diplomacy. with her neighbours. Publicly, there is no visible change in Oman's policy in Yemen, if it remains the birthplace of the Houthis' window on the world and a silent and effective ally against the group's opponents in Yemen.
This report is part of a series of publications by the Sana'a Center highlighting the roles of foreign state and non-state actors in Yemen.
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
