Bayhan’s handing over to al-Houthi..Brotherhood goals and security risks for Saudi Arabia and international navigation (2-2)

English - Wednesday 20 October 2021 الساعة 06:00 pm
Sana'a, NewsYemen, a special report:

 Brotherhood goals with a regional and international dimension

 In the other direction, the hidden agendas of the Brotherhood in Yemen (the Islah Party) are not limited to their goals of a local nature, but go beyond them to seeking to achieve agendas with regional and international dimensions related to their relationship and subordination to the secret international organization of the Brotherhood, and their relations with regional powers and states that are linked, support and finance this organization  and the movements affiliated with it at the global level, especially at the level of the Arab region.

Observers and analysts unanimously agree that there is a lot of evidence confirming the involvement of the Yemeni Brotherhood in implementing the agendas of the regional forces supporting the Brotherhood, which take hostile positions against Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular.  Which can be indicated by the shift in the media and political position of the leaders, journalists and activists of the Brotherhood in Yemen from supporting the Arab coalition since the first day of its launch of the Decisive Storm against the Houthi militias, to the opposite, with the outbreak of a dispute between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain with Qatar and the severing of diplomatic relations between them in mid-2017.  Where we witnessed a complete shift in the position of the Yemeni Brotherhood, who began attacking the Arab coalition and describing it as an alliance to occupy Yemen, and even adopted the same concepts, terminology and media campaigns that were adopted and broadcast by Qatar and its media, especially Al-Jazeera, not to mention their financial and supportive stance completely for Turkey and Qatar against Saudi Arabia in the case of the killing of  Journalist Khashoggi.

Despite the UAE’s announcement of the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen at the beginning of 2020, as well as the reconciliation process between the Gulf states and Egypt with Qatar at the Al-Ula summit held in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of this year, the Yemeni Brotherhood continued to adopt media campaigns targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia, using the events in Yemen as a material  Through it, they implement agendas linked to their supporters, most notably Qatar and Turkey, a support that cannot be read apart from the agendas of the secret international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood’s campaigns against the coalition included the latter’s description of the occupation of Yemen, and that it stands behind every defeat that the legitimate forces are subjected to, including the hastening of the Brotherhood media and Yemeni affairs official in Al-Jazeera channel Ahmed Al-Shalafi to justify the fall of the Abdiya district center in Marib in the hands of the Houthi militia as a result of the withdrawal of fighters as a result  to run out of ammunition, in an attempt to hold the coalition responsible for the failure of the fighters against the Houthi militia.  

This is denied by the numbers and statistics announced by the coalition about the number of air raids it launched to support the fighters against the Houthi militia in the Abdiya district alone, not to mention what the Houthi militia announced, which said that it seized many weapons after taking control of the center of the Abdiya district, as well as the rest of the districts that were handed over to it in  Marib and Shabwa.

In the same vein, while the Brotherhood’s control of legitimacy resulted in harnessing all its capabilities and resources and the support provided to it by the coalition for the benefit of their leaders who hold most and most important sovereign positions within the legitimate authority, the presidency and the government, and they deliberately hired their families and relatives, especially in the diplomatic corps and in Yemeni embassies in various countries of the world, including, which enabled them to loot all the money provided by the coalition in favor of establishing investment projects for themselves and their families abroad, not to mention their complete control over Marib’s revenues from oil and gas, but at the same time they insist on obstructing the government’s return to work from Aden, and they are investing in the deteriorating economic conditions and the collapse of the currency to hold their opponents on the one hand, especially the Transitional Council, and on the other hand, the coalition responsible for this situation, which was produced by their failed and corrupt legitimacy.

The Qatari Al-Jazeera channel’s recent broadcast of the Al-Motahhari program, which was devoted to broadcasting allegations about the hidden ambitions of the Emirates on the island of Socotra, similar to what the channel did previously with regard to the West Coast, was only a model for the agendas implemented by the Brotherhood in Yemen targeting Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Arab coalition.

The allegations of the Brotherhood in Yemen about the coalition and its role in Yemen are almost identical to the claims of Iran, which considers the Houthi militia its arm in Yemen, which can be explained by the convergence of the interests of the two parties if not the result of understandings taking place between them, especially when we find that this position is led by the Yemeni Brotherhood wing located in Turkey, and what  The spread of an image that combines the leaders of the Brotherhood in Yemen, Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani, and Hamid Al-Ahmar with the Brotherhood leader and the head of the Hamas political office, whose affiliation with Iran in Turkey does not hide but a model for the hidden understandings and agreements between the parties supporting the Brotherhood and Iran regarding the Yemen file.

The dangers of the Houthi control of Bayhan and the importance of its liberation

 Analysts unanimously agree that the strategic location of the Bayhan district in Shabwa governorate is what opens the door to the extrapolation of many of the risks arising from the Houthi militia’s control over it after the withdrawal of the Muslim Brotherhood forces from it.


The Houthi militia had taken control of the Baihan district for the first time in 2015 AD after its coup against power, but it was defeated after fierce battles in 2017, which contributed to improving the position of the national army, which was able to cut off the militias’ supplies to the southern governorates and enabled it to advance in Al-Bayda governorate and support its presence in  Marib, before returning and controlling it again on September 21 last.


The new control of the Houthis over the strategically important directorate came as a result of a clear Brotherhood betrayal that began with their practice against all their opponents in the province they run through their governor, Muhammad bin Adyio, and their quest to monopolize all the capabilities, capabilities and joints of power, which was confirmed when their tanks headed to the directorate in 2019 and seized it.  


Instead of turning the Brotherhood’s authority in Shabwa into a supporter of the battle against the Houthi militias in Al-Bayda and Marib, that authority turned its interests towards other agendas, most notably seeking to control the invading Balhaf facility, and launching political and media campaigns claiming that this facility is occupied by the coalition, not to mention the process of creating conflicts.  And consolidating the division between the sons and tribes of Shabwa, all of which contributed to the disruption of the ability to confront the Houthi militia, and even made it easier for it to achieve victories in Al-Bayda and Marib, all the way to Shabwa and its control over Bayhan in its three districts.


Analysts confirm that the risks of the Houthi militia’s control of Baihan lie in its location, which is linked to the borders with the Marib governorate, which will enable the Houthis to impose his siege on Marib and achieve his goal of controlling it, especially since Bayhan is located near the Safer oil fields and Jannah in Marib. 

 In addition, the LNG transmission line from Marib to Balhaf runs alongside it, not to mention that the district is a crossroads linking three governorates: Shabwa, Marib and Al-Bayda.


Observer analysts point out that this site of Bayhan will enable the Houthi militia to fully secure its control over Al-Bayda governorate, and create a geographical space that will enable it to impose a siege on Marib, not to mention using Bayhan as a starting point for moving towards completing control of Shabwa and the southern governorates.


Analysts and observers warn of the dangers of the Houthi militia's continued control of Bayhan, while at the same time leaving the Shabwa governorate in the hands of the Brotherhood's authority and the legitimate leaders who are only able to escape and produce repeated defeats and give up all the successes achieved in the military battle against the Houthi militia during the past seven years.

  They explained that this is not limited to that, but also includes the risks it poses to the national security of Saudi Arabia in the event that the Houthi militias succeed in controlling Marib border with it and extending its control over Shabwa governorate, in particular the Balhaf facility for exporting gas located on the coast of the Arabian Sea, and what this constitutes of dangers to navigation in this sea.


Given that the fall of Bayhan in the hands of the Houthis increases the risks of the fall of Marib, which is rich in oil and is of border importance to Saudi Arabia, there is a consensus among analysts that protecting Marib governorate today requires the speedy liberation of Bayhan from the control of the Houthi militias, which can only be achieved by a decision taken by the Saudi-led coalition and puts in  Considering that those who contributed to the fall and handover of Baihan cannot lead the process of its liberation, and that it is possible to reach an understanding to create a new political and administrative authority that will take over the administration of Shabwa governorate, and in a way that contributes to unifying the ranks of other national resistance forces to take over the task of launching a military operation aimed at liberating the Bayhan district from the Houthi militia  He developed an urgent plan to protect Marib, before this battle turns into achieving the goal of regaining control over all the areas handed over to the Houthi militias in Shabwa, Al Bayda and Marib.


Analysts conclude by saying that if the Brotherhood succeeds in imposing their agendas in blackmailing the coalition, the consequences of this will not stop at the limits of the loss of Bayhan, but rather the loss of all the gains for which the Decisive Storm took place, in addition to that it will extend to include Marib, Shabwa, and possibly the rest of the southern governorates, thus opening the way for  Al-Houthi militias to achieve their goals by controlling the sources of oil and gas, and international navigation in the Arabian Sea, and the dangers that may result from this, especially in terms of Iran’s investment of these gains in its struggle against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and the realization of its agendas in destabilizing Arab national security.